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This article is a reflection on the NSU Win-ter Symposium of March 2020, entitled ‘Feminism and Hospitality: Religious and 
Crit ical Perspectives in dialogue with a Secular 
Age’.1 It contends with moral judgments which 
regard charity as an act of alienation from the 
other and as a reiteration of hierarchies of power. 
Instead of this conceptualisation, I propose 
an ethics of charity in terms of an ethics of the 
reflective agency of otherness. This ethics of 
charity entails acts of aid for an other which stem 
from the recognition of the agency pertaining to 
both parties. It will be shown how this recogni-
tion of agency, and the reciprocity it entails, is 
critical for the success of the charitable endeav-
our in two ways: first, for the manifestation of the 
act itself of aiding and providing for another; sec-
ond, for the assertion of the other’s own agency 
through the reciprocal act of charity.
1 I am thankful to the coordinators of the 
symposium, Laura Hellsten and Nicole 
des Bouvrie, in collaboration with Åbo 
Akademi University, the Donner Institute 
for Research in Religion and Cultural His­
tory, and the Inez and Julius Polin Insti­
tute for Theological Research, for creating 
the framework in which such reflections 
can sprout and grow. To my friends and 
colleagues, old and new participants of 
the NSU ‘Feminist Philosophy’ sympo­
sia, I express gratitude for continuously 
intriguing and challenging me. Specific­
ally, for the vivacious discursive adventure 
together that brought this article into being. 
The room fills with lively conversation as 
people enter. The low hum is accentuated 
by staccatos of voices in edifying discus­
sion, the excited hand­waving of reunions 
between friends and colleagues, the kindly 
curious salutations between those newly 
acquainted. Time is in motion – the lectur­
ers rise and teach and pass to and from the 
front of the room. Presentations and work­
shops weave into hours of learning, mutual 
study, and explor ation. Empirical findings 
are imparted, theses offered, and contem­
plations shared. These formulate into con­
ceptualisations of hospitality and otherness, 
refugees and volunteers, biblical texts and 
church asylum, ethics and praxis, solidar­
ity and charity. Charity. As an antonym of 
solidarity. The act of giving provisions to a 
person in need is conceptualised as an act 
stemming from and reiterating alienation 
from the other, a stance reifying an inequal­
ity of power and resources that does not 
recognise the human in those on the receiv­
ing end. Solidarity, on the other hand, as 
a reciprocity; as an act of morality not for 
the good of the other but for the good in 
itself. Solidarity as the experience of receiv­
ing hospitality from those to whom one 
gives aid, not an experience of offering hos­
pitality oneself. Solidarity as not receiving 
thanks.
188Approaching Religion • Vol. 10, No. 2 • November 2020 
My brows furrow. What are these moral 
judgments I am hearing, that ‘charity is 
bad’? That charity is an act which perpetu­
ates privilege rather than remedies inequal­
ities? That reciprocity requires not receiv­
ing thanks? That recognising the other 
entails rebuffing the recognition of oneself 
and the aid and hospitality one offers the 
other? How is it that in this symposium of 
feminist philosophers, theolo gians, law­
yers, and social scientists, a symposium 
originating from and occurring in the wel­
fare states of the Nordic region – that here 
the recurring ethical sentiment is that 
‘charity is bad’?
Perplexed by this moral judgment, I 
delve into days of dialogue with myself and 
with my colleagues about these notions of 
charity versus solidarity, about the ethics of 
hospitality, gratitude, and recognition. The 
notion raised by my friends is that charity 
is an act of giving aid to a person in need 
enabled by one’s position of privilege in the 
hierarchy of economic and social situ ations. 
They postulate that such an act is antithet­
ical to solidarity. The privilege entailed in 
the deed renders it inhospit able towards 
the person receiving the charity, thus deep­
ening the chasms of alienation and inequal­
ity between the sides instead of alleviating 
them. Charity fails to see the other, to rec­
ognise their agency and sympathise with 
their situation. Rather, it is a one­sided 
movement of the transfer of goods initially 
acquired due to society’s unjust distribu­
tion. The receiver, the other, is thus ren­
dered devoid of action, their full humanity 
unrecognised. Subsequently, the hierarchy 
is maintained. Even the offering of grati­
tude by the receiver of the charity, my col­
leagues posit, is not a reciprocity of agency. 
On the contrary, such thanks would further 
entrench the receiver in their disadvantage 
and otherness in relation to the giver of the 
charity. For, they explain, it would be an act 
of submission, of maintaining the hierar­
chical order which alienates this receiving 
other, denying them their human agency. 
This denial relates to the perception of the 
other’s agency in the eyes of the giver, in the 
eyes of the other themselves, and in soci­
ety’s categorial view of ‘givers’ and ‘receiv­
ers’ of charity.
Inversely, my colleagues define solidar­
ity as the act of seeing and recognising the 
other as agentic and in possession of capac­
ities. To give aid to an other in solidarity, 
one must dispense with the situational 
awareness which deems one to be acting in 
a positive fashion. One must not consider 
the discrepancy in commodities between 
the two sides which elicits the need of the 
other and the capacity to give of the giver. 
Solidarity, my friends define, is a deed 
done for an other, but which rather entails 
receiving from the other more than having 
given. The other is not the receiving party 
but rather the benefactor to whom the 
aid­giver is in debt. This depiction is one 
of being able to help others only by negat­
ing the help one has given. One must not 
rejoice in this act of kindness, nor in the 
positive outcome it brings to the other. For, 
then it will have been done for personal 
emotional gain, obscuring the recognition 
of the other, the affinity with them, and 
the morality of the act. My colleagues are 
unwilling to name the act as providing aid 
for someone in need, or to receive thanks 
for it. According to their approach, receiv­
ing thanks is to regard oneself as superior 
and thus to be inhospit able to the other and 
degrade them.
An ethical creed is discussed: the obli­
gation to do good because it is the good 
in itself rather than for the pleasure, wel­
fare, or will of either side of the engage­
ment. This Kantian­style creed2 causes 
2 See generally Kant’s theory of the ‘good in 
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me to ponder its denial of the value of the 
experi ences that charity arouses for both 
giver and receiver, as though such recogni­
tion would mar the act’s morality. Indeed, I 
too am ethically ambivalent regarding acts 
of charity stemming from the giver’s pleas­
ure in the act or its outcomes. In such a 
case, is one truly fulfilling a moral obliga­
tion, or serving one’s self­appreciation? Yet, 
I cannot accede to an ethics which refutes 
the agency of both parties of the charit­
able act – agencies which enable the charity 
and which are cultivated by it. Therefore, I 
make a request to rescue charity – the act 
of providing aid for an other with means 
one is privileged to possess – from the bad 
faith into which it has fallen. To reclaim the 
ethics of charity as an ethics of the reflec­
tive agency of otherness.
I postulate an ethics of charity, as acts of 
aid for an other, which stems from the rec­
ognition of the agency pertaining to both 
parties, by each of them, by their surround­
ing social context, and by the conceptual 
scheme of what charity is. This recogni­
tion of agency is critical for the success of 
the charitable endeavour in two ways. Most 
importantly, one must recognise one’s con­
tribution and ability to provide for others 
in order to more fully harness one’s cap­
abilities, in actions and in resources, for the 
aid of others. For ex ample, if one blinds one­
self to the economic resources in one’s pos­
session, whether they have been acquired 
through personal effort or by virtue of 
social situation, the money will be rendered 
conceptually less acces sible even for the 
betterment of others. For, abashment con­
cerning the possession of such wealth will 
itself ’ in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals, originally published in German 
in 1785 and available in English in Mary J. 
Gregor and Jens Timmermann’s edition of 
1998.
inhibit its use as a consequence of a reluc­
tance to draw the attention of others and of 
oneself to its existence. If a person humbly 
hides the talents they have – such as car­
pentry or musical artistry – they will not 
be sought after when an other is in need of 
those talents – to fix a broken cupboard, or 
to comfort people in their sorrow.
A lack of recognition of one’s own cap­
abilities, specifically in relation to the 
person in need, can furthermore lead to 
a self­silencing, thwarting one’s potential 
offer of aid. This can arise in such a situ­
ation where a person lacking parental 
duties enters the house of a friend who is a 
parent to a young child, to find the kitchen 
in disarray and the sink full of unwashed 
dishes. If the non­parent hinders themself 
from acknowledging their privileged posi­
tion in the specific sense of having energies 
and time in relation to the parent, if they 
do not wish to shame the parent by relating 
straightforwardly to the untended kitchen 
and to the disparity between their posi­
tions, the non­parent may impede themself 
from entering the kitchen and washing the 
dishes.3 Thus, this refusal to recognise one’s 
own repository of resources – whether 
monetary, in talent, or in capac ities – inhib­
its the realisation of one’s agency to help or 
provide for an other. It entails a restriction 
on oneself, on one’s actions, and on one’s 
resources, hampering their manifestation 
and use in the fullest extent possible. This 
obstruction of one’s own agency directly 
diminishes the acts of charity that are pos­
sible for one to perform for others.
3 I thank my friend­who­is­a­parent for 
providing me with this opportunity to act 
in charity and to experience its reflective 
agency of otherness, consequently con­
tributing to the conceptualisation of this 
‘reflective ethics of charity’.
190Approaching Religion • Vol. 10, No. 2 • November 2020 
The second manner in which recog­
nition of agency is critical for the success 
of the charitable endeavour involves the 
reflectiveness of agency constituted in the 
act of charity. In a similar vein as Beauvoir’s 
The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948),4 the agen­
cies – and the subjective freedoms – of 
both sides of the charitable act are innately 
linked. This is ‘the bond of each [hu]man 
with all others … [for] every [hu]man 
needs the freedom of other[s]’ (1948: 30, 
my un­masculinisation). In the charit­
able endeavour, when a person recognises 
that they provide for an other, that recog­
nition of one’s agency entails a recognition 
of the agency inherent in the receiver. By 
naming the act of charity, acknowledging 
its enactment, its facilitators, and its results, 
the giver of the charity enables the receiver 
to realise their own agency by engaging 
in reciprocity. Once the aid is named and 
acknowledged by the giver, it is possible for 
the receiver to acknowledge the reception 
and thus offer gratitude – the lack of which 
would deprive them of their being active 
and resourceful agents. Preventing their 
ability to thank and partake as reciprocal 
partners in the act of charity, diminishes the 
other to an object of reception rather than a 
subject with the capacities to contribute to 
others. This severing of the reciprocity inte­
gral to the act of charity comprises the sev­
ering of the reflective trait of agencies. As 
Beauvoir writes, ‘[d]ishonestly ignoring the 
subjectivity of [one’s own] choice… [one] 
ignores the value of the subjectivity and the 
freedom of others’ (ibid. p. 20).
Moreover, this restraint of the other’s 
very agency upholds the hierarchies 
between the two parties as sole­giver and 
sole­receiver. The inequality in resources 
4 See also Beauvoir’s Pyrrhus and Cineas 
originally published in French in 1944.
that one attempts to blind oneself to and 
dissociate from are precisely what facilitates 
the ability to aid others in need. Even in a 
utopian world where all resources would be 
perpetually allocated equally and equitably, 
discrepancies between people would not 
cease to exist. They may take the form of 
varying talents, differing familial situations, 
or loss of resources due to natural disasters. 
This may offer an ‘optimistic’ interpretation 
of the biblical claim in Deuteronomy 15:11: 
‘For there will never cease to be poor in 
the land; therefore I am commanding you 
saying: Open your hand generously to your 
brother, to your indigent, and to your des­
titute in your land.’5 There will always be an 
other in need for whom one’s tangible and 
intangible resources may – and must – pro­
vide aid.
The lack of recognition of one’s capac­
ity to help others does not repeal existent 
inequalities but rather maintains them. 
To disassociate oneself from the charity 
one has provided is a stance of privilege. 
It is the person situated at the higher ends 
of the social hierarchy who can afford to 
blind themself to the disparity of privileges 
between them and others, even while they 
themself enact that difference by giving aid 
to someone in need. By repudiating the rec­
ognition of one’s own act of charity and the 
reciprocity of the other, a person shrouds 
themself in an illusion that they are not 
more privileged than others. Thus, they fail 
to recognise the less privileged positions 
of the other and obstruct the latter’s abil­
ity to reciprocate and re­establish their own 
agency. The self­deprecation of preventing 
the acknowledgement and gratitude for 
charitable acts prevents the receiver from 
realising their own agency in their regained 
self­sufficiency and ability to reciprocate 
5 English translation from Sefaria 2020. 
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the act of giving. In such a manner, one 
precisely fortifies and reproduces the in ­
equalities of society rather than diminish­
ing them, as could be done by fortifying the 
agency of the other in the reflective ethics 
of charity.
The reflectiveness of agency entailed in 
the reflective ethics of charity brings me 
back to the ambivalence regarding acts of 
charity stemming from the giver’s pleasure 
in the act or its outcomes. This ‘moral anx­
iety’ (Beauvoir 1948: 31) brings into ques­
tion the character of such acts of charity 
if a consideration of the experiences and 
wills of those involved deems the act to be 
egoistical and perhaps entirely unethical. 
Beauvoir’s answer manifests the reflective 
ethics of charity, explaining that ‘there is 
no ethics against which this charge, which 
immediately destroys itself, cannot be 
leveled; for how can I worry about what 
does not concern me? I concern others and 
they concern me. There we have an irre­
ducible truth. The me–others relationship 
is as indissoluble as the subject–object rela­
tionship’ (ibid. p. 31).
As experiencing beings who are linked 
to each other in existence, freedom, and 
subjectivity, it is thus inherently the case 
that ethically we are linked as well. Our 
acts of charity connect us to each other and 
to the bond of agency which connects us 
through the mutual reflection of our other­
ness. Solidarity and charity are not contest­
ing forms of action. Charity does not negate 
the ability to be hospit able towards an other 
and to be in solidarity with them. Rather, 
charity in its fullest application enables a 
deeper sense of recognition of the other. It is 
true that acts of charity, as I have portrayed 
them, can bring with them ethic al ambiva­
lence regarding the giver’s wants and plea­
sure in the act or its outcomes. My creed 
of charity can furthermore touch upon a 
discomfort felt by many, my colleagues 
and myself included, about a blatant recog­
nition of one’s own privilege. But, it is the 
honest acknowledgment of one’s tangible 
and intangible resources that renders its 
use for others possible. Admission – and 
appreciation – of what one possesses, ren­
ders it accessible to be used for the good 
and need of others.
So too does the reluctance to accept 
gratitude from the receiving other impinge 
on the very hospitality it is attempting to 
achieve. For, to prevent the receiver of aid 
from expressing thanks does not acceler­
ate this other’s agency, nor does it dimin­
ish the unequal distribution of goods that 
may have caused the latter’s need in the first 
place. Quite the contrary. To prevent thanks 
silences the receiver’s ability to speak their 
experience. It arrests this person’s drive to 
action – an action that would have placed 
them on reciprocal ground of agency and 
a capacity to give with the provider of the 
charity. The intuition of unease that my 
colleagues convey in our discussions is 
understandable, common, and stems from 
a moral and caring stance. However, it is 
the flip side of the ethical ambiguity con­
cerning aiding an other for one’s own plea­
sure. Catering to one’s own unease at being 
recognised as privileged reinstates the very 
hierarchies inherent in placing the self­in­
terests of the privileged over the fundamen­
tal recognition of the other. Though well 
meant, it is an inhospitable act of denial of 
agency; the very result my friends seek to 
avoid.
To be hospitable is to engage eye to eye 
with the other, to recognise the eminence 
in the other’s face (Lévinas 1969: 262, 293). 
This is a two­directional motion. By look­
ing into the other’s eyes, one not only sees 
the vitally human in the other; one mani­
fests it. For, to look someone in the eye is to 
open one’s own eyes for the other to actively 
look into. It is an agentic action towards 
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the other which inherently instigates the 
agency of the other towards oneself. As a 
human of action, one looks into the other’s  
eyes and sees there the human of action 
agentically looking back. Only by allow­
ing the other to recognise oneself, can one 
recognise the other in their full immensity 
and competence. If one is to avert one’s eyes 
in discomfort, what is being denied is not 
the auditory articulations of gratitude, but 
the very agency of the other. This mutual 
recognition is imperative for ascertaining 
solidarity and is ingrained in the reflective 
ethics of charity. It is this reflectiveness of 
agency, of morality, and of the profound 
recognition between the giver of goods 
and the giver of gratitude, by which acts of 
charity embrace the mutual experience of 
being in solidarity. 
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